On Thursday November 21st, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed Jussie Smollet’s felony convictions for falsely reporting that he had been the victim of a hate crime in People v. Smollett. Smollett was originally charged in 2019 with felony disorderly conduct for making false reports that he had been the victim of a hate crime. Shortly after the indictment was issued, the state made a motion to nol-pros—or voluntarily dismiss—the charges based on an agreement between the State and Smollett based on Smollett’s forfeiting of his bond and agreement to perform community service. The judge granted the motion and the charges were dismissed.
After a few weeks of public outcry, a retired state appellate court judge filed a motion to appoint a special prosecutor on the basis after the Cook County State’s Attorney recused herself, the subsequent appointment of a “Acting State’s Attorney” was invalid. This motion which was granted by a different judge than the judge who had earlier dismissed the charges on the basis that the proceedings after the State’s Attorney recused herself were void due to lack of a lawful prosecutor—including the agreement. The new special prosecutor pursued a new indictment which alleged six charges of felony orderly misconduct.
When Smollett objected to the new charges and filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court denied the motion. The judge determined that because there was no properly appointed prosecutor that the earlier agreement and dismissal were unlawful. Smollet then proceeded to trial where he was convicted. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held that—despite the negotiated agreement to nolle pros—the dismissal of the original charges was not binding because it was not a final disposition. Smollet then asked the Illinois Supreme Court to hear the case.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision because, in its view, the original dismissal was the result of a negotiated agreement. The Supreme Court noted that when a defendant negotiates a plea agreement with binding terms, once the defendant has pleaded guilty, the State must honor its part of the agreement. As the Court quoted from one of its previous opinions:
The prosecution must honor the terms of agreements it makes with defendants. To dispute the validity of this precept would surely result in the total nullification of the bargaining system between the prosecution and the defense. Therefore, this court believes that if the prosecution did make an agreement with the defendant, it must abide by its agreement in this case.
Critical to the Court’s analysis was the fact that Smollet had upheld his end of the bargain. The Court compared the agreement in Smollet’s case to a cooperation agreement for immunity. In those type of agreements, the defendant cooperates in reliance upon the negotiated promise of immunity. And once the defendant has acted in reliance upon that negotiated promise, fundamental fairness requires the government to abide by that promise.
Notably, the Court also found that even if the “Acting State’s Attorney” lacked actual authority to negotiate and enter into a deal, the parties proceeded on the premise that there was authority. The fact that the judge who appointed the special prosecutor found that the prior dismissal was void did not just magically make it so. All of the previous cases cited to support the idea that the lack of actual authority made prior dismissal unlawful involved the defendant challenging the prosecutor’s authority—not a defendant acting in the belief that the prosecutor had authority.
Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was apparent from its opening sentence: “The public justifiably expects the State, above all others, to keep its bond.” And as the Court closed: “A contrary result would be patently untenable. It would violate long-cherished principles of fundamental fairness. It would be antithetical to, and corrosive of, the integrity and functionality of the criminal justice system that we strive to maintain.”
