On September 10, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court issued its opinion in United States v. Gaines. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether Class D felonies under Alabama law always count as a prior conviction that triggers the federal law criminalizing possession of a firearm by felons. The Court determined that, for some individuals, a conviction for a Class D felony in Alabama does not qualify for the federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms because of how Alabama law required Class D felonies to be sentenced.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is illegal for a person “who has been convicted in any court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” This law is generally referred to as “felon-in-possession” because, in most cases, convictions that can be punished by more than one year in prison are felonies.
In 2018, Alabama amended its sentencing laws to change the offense level of certain crimes. One of those changes was to create Class D felonies—examples of which are: third-degree theft of property, third-degree theft of services, third-degree possession of a forged instrument, and third-degree receiving stolen property. As part of these changes, the legislature amended § 15-18-8 of the Alabama Code. Under § 15-18-8(b), when a person was convicted of a Class D felony, the circuit court was required to sentence the person to probation, drug court, a pretrial diversion program, or community corrections for not more than 2 years. Prison time was not allowed for Class D felonies unless a defendant had previously been convicted of 3 or more felonies or two or more Class A or B felonies. In the 2019 amendment to § 15-18-8, this language requiring non-prison sentences for Class D felonies was left intact, but it was removed in the 2023 amendment.
In 2019, Gaines pleaded guilty to third-degree receiving stolen property and was given a 24-month suspended sentence with 2 years of probation. A few months later, he was in a car during a traffic stop where a gun was discovered and Gaines claimed the gun. He was charged with and tried for violating § 922(g)(1) because of his felony conviction for third-degree receiving stolen property.
On appeal, Gaines argued that his Class D felony did not qualify under § 922(g)(1) because under § 15-18-8, he could not have been sentenced to imprisonment for a year or more. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Gaines based on prior decisions by the Supreme Court that looked at how to classify prior convictions. As the Court pointed out, § 922(g)(1) is known as felon-in-possession, but the statute does not say felon—it says more than one year in prison.
Section 15-18-8 does not permit any prison sentences for Class D felonies, much less a prison sentence of a year or more, unless the defendant has 3 or more prior felonies or 2 or more Class A or B felonies. Imprisonment refers to time “in a prison, jail, or a comparable facility.” Under § 15-18-8(b), probation, drug court, a pretrial diversion program, or community corrections are the available sentencing options for a defendant convicted of a Class D felony who does not have prior felony convictions and those options do not qualify as prison time.
What this means is that if a person committed a Class D felony in Alabama between March 28, 2018, and June 30, 2023, then the conviction does not make that person subject to a § 922(g)(1) charge in federal court. The Alabama legislature changed the language of § 15-18-8 in 2023 and allowed prison time for Class D felonies. Importantly, however, the date of the offense is what determines the potential sentence. So, if the Class D felony occurred between March 2018 and June 2023, but the person wasn’t convicted and sentenced until 2025, then they are still subject to the 2018-2023 sentencing provisions for Class D felonies.
While Gaines does have an impact for people who have Class D felony convictions without prior convictions from this time period, it is still in no way advisable to have a firearm if you have been convicted of a Class D felony. It would not be surprising if the full Eleventh Circuit took this decision up for rehearing and reversed the panel’s decision.
