On Wednesday, January 14 the United States Supreme Court released some opinions from its docket for the 2025 term. Two of these are fairly important criminal decisions—one dealing with the Fourth Amendment and the second dealing with federal firearms laws.
In Case v. Montana, the Supreme Court addressed the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. This exception comes into play when officer are responding to an active emergency rather investigating criminal activity. In Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), the Supreme Court addressed this exception in detail. Under this exception, officers may enter a house without a warrant when they have have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that a person is “seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” The dispute in Case was whether officers are required to have probable cause to form an objectively reasonable basis.
In this case, police were informed that Case was threatening suicide and may have shot himself. When the officers arrived, no one answered the door; but they could see an empty holster and something that looked like a suicide note, so they entered to render emergency aid. Inside, Case was hiding in a closet; and, when officers entered the bedroom, Case opened the closet curtain with a black object in his hand. The officer thinking it was a gun fired and hit Case, who survived. Another officer found a handgun in the laundry basket next to where Case had been standing. Case was charged with assaulting a police officer and moved to suppress all the evidence arguing that it was a warrantless entry. The trial court denied the motion, which was affirmed on appeal.
When it got to the Supreme Court, certiorari was granted to resolve a split on “whether police officers entering a home to provide emergency aid need ‘probable cause’ to believe that an occupant is in peril.” The Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress but didn’t do so based on a showing of probable cause. Instead, it emphasized its decision in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), which held that the emergency aid exception requires an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant faces serious danger. The Court rejected how Montana addressed the issue because Montana’s test strayed from Brigham City and drew on concepts used to evaluate Terry stops to investigate criminal activity. The emergency aid exception isn’t
concerned with investigating crimes—which is why “an emergency aid entry provides no basis to search the premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency while maintaining the officers’ safety.” This difference is also why the Court rejected Case’s argument that the emergency aid exception requires probable cause to believe an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened.
So, all of this is to say that Brigham City‘s reasonable basis standard is reaffirmed and that there is no probable cause requirement for the emergency aid exception because it is not a criminal investigation oriented warrantless entry.
In Alabama, Ex parte Byrd, 379 So.3d 473 (Ala. 2022), is the most recent emergency aid case. Byrd cites to a Seventh Circuit opinion saying that there is no probable cause requirement for emergency aid, but it isn’t a focal point of the opinion. Some parts of Byrd may need to be reconsidered in light how the Supreme Court ruled in Case, but not the overall holding of Byrd.
In Barrett v. United States, the Court addressed whether Double Jeopardy bars convictions under two different subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 924 when the same act is what triggers both statutes. Under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), it is a crime to use, carry, or possess a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Under § (924)(j) there are enhanced penalties for persons who cause the death of a person though the use of a firearm while violating § 924(c). For (j)(1), if the killing constitutes a murder as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1111, the punishment is death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life; for (j)2), if the killing constitutes manslaughter as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1112, the punishment is based on § 1112. The question was whether, because a person who violates 924(j) has also violated 924(c), that person can be convicted and sentenced under both provisions.
Barrett’s case went back and forth between the Second Circuit and the district court several times over sentencing issues before the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Second Circuit’s decision that §§ 924(c) and (j) are separate offenses allowing for a defendant to be convicted of and punished for both. The Second Circuit’s decision put it on the same side of a split as the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Julian, 633 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that under Blockburger §§ 924(c) and (j) are the same offense for Double Jeopardy purposes. Most of the opinion is technical language looking at the history and purpose of the statutes; but, in the end, the Court’s decision means that a person cannot be convicted and punished for both §§ 922(c) and 924(j).
This is important in Alabama because as long as a case is pending in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit, or before the United States Supreme Court, the judgment isn’t final. While a case is pending, decisions from the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court apply to the case. And, because the Eleventh Circuit’s previous ruling on this issue was overturned, any defendants currently charged under these subsections of § 924 or whose cases are pending on appeal, will benefit from the Supreme Court’s decision.
